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Sexual Harassment By a Public Official Gives 
Rise to a Section 1983 Claim: A Legal Argument 
George Likourezos * 
I. Introduction 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The foundation of the United States of America is rooted in mankind's 
inherent desire to live in a free and democratic societyl where everyone 
has equal protection under the law. Our founders embodied this funda-
mental principle in the U.S. Constitution,2 and our federal and state 
governments embodied it in federal3 and state laws.4 
* George Likourezos is a third-year law student at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg 
Law Center. Mr. Likourezos is a law student associate with Dilworth & Barrese in 
Uniondale, N.Y. During the Summers of 1994 and 1993, Mr. Likourezos worked as a 
summer associate for Wyatt, Gerber, Burke & Badie, New York City, and for Casella & 
Hespos, New York City, respectively. He graduated from Polytechnic University in May 
1992 with a Bachelor's of Science in Electrical Engineering and a Master's of Science in 
Operations Management. Since 1990, Mr. Likourezos has served as a contributing editor 
for Proceedings of the IEEE, a technical journal published by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers. He also currently serves as the Editor-in-Chief of the Restatement, 
the student newspaper of the Touro Law Center, and as a Research Editor for the Journal 
of the Suffolk Academy of Law. 
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not those of his 
employers or any other entity. 
1. See, e.g., Knoll v. Springfield Township Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1983), 
cert. granted, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 471 U.S. 288 
(1985) (stating "we agree that the purpose of the Constitution is to assure the people a free 
and democratic society and that the final aim of that society is to provide as much freedom 
and equality as possible for individuals ... "). 
2. Id. 
3. See, e.g., Marshall v. International Longshoremen's Assoc. of Tampa, 617 F.2d 96, 
98 (5th Cir. 1980). In interpreting a federal statute, the court stated that the "statute was 
designed to guarantee free and democratic union elections similar to the model of our 
political elections [echoed in the Constitution]." Id. 
4. See, e.g., Nichols v. Dole, 136 L.R.R.M. 2133 (D. S.C. 1990). In interpreting a state 
law, the court stated that the law "promotes the interests of the membership in terms of 
providing [it] with thefree, democratic choice of leaders." [d. (emphasis added). 
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After the Civil War, a growing wave of terrorism by the Ku Klux Klan 
threatened the rights of former black slaves. On March 28, 1871, in 
response to this terrorism, Rep. Samuel Shellabarger (R., Ohio) introduced 
a bills which was later enacted as the Ku Klux Act of 1871. Section 1 of 
the Act passed almost as introduced with no amendment and with little 
debate in both Houses of Congress.6 
Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983,7 was first interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1939.8 Section 
1983 extends its protection to all persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States who are deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
federal laws by a person acting under color of state law.9 Similar to the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendmeneo and the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, II Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights of its 
own. The purpose of Section 1983 is to create a cause of action for 
citizens who are deprived of the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and 
immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendmentl2 or federal law by 
reasons of prejudice, passion, neglect or intolerance. The Supreme Court 
has held, however, that a cause of action under Section 1983 requires a 
5. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1871). 
6. Briscoe V. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 361 (1983) ("Of all the measures in the Ku Klux 
Act, Section 1 generated the least controversy ... "); Adickes V. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 
U.S. 144, 164 (1970) ("[T]here was comparatively little debate over Section 1 of the Ku 
Klux Act, and it was eventually enacted in form identical to that in which it was introduced 
in the House. "). 
Id. 
7. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1988) provides in part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
8. Hague v. Committee of Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (right to assemble and 
distribute literature was within the protection of Section 1983 of Title 42 as a privilege or 
immunity for all citizens of the United States, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
9. See, e.g., id. 
10. The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, provides: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2-2000e-17 (1982). 
12. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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deprivation of a right caused by someone acting under color of state 
authority. I3 
B. DISCRIMINATION AND TITLE VII 
Section 1983 can be used to bring claims under different substantive 
laws such as Title vn l4 or the equal protection clause. Under a Section 
1983 cause of action, pursuant to a Title VII violation, courts have 
generally found for plaintiffs, when the plaintiffs were discriminated against 
by a governmental agency or a public official. I5 For example, a district 
court recognized sexual harassment as a form of discrimination actionable 
under Title VII in 1976,16 and as a result gave victims of sexual harass-
ment by a public official recourse under Section 1983.17 
In addition, if plaintiffs can show a constitutional violation under the 
equal protection clause, they have another cause of action under Section 
1983 pursuant to a violation of the equal protection clause, regardless of 
Title VII's concurrent application. 18 However, plaintiffs could be 
precluded from bringing a Section 1983 claim pursuant to a violation of 
federal law or the equal protection clause under the doctrine of res 
judicata. 19 This may occur if a sexual harassment claim under Section 
1983 is brought in state court and then a Title VII claim is brought in 
13. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 
U.S. 144, 150 (1970). 
14. The portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which is concerned with employment 
discrimination is commonly called Title VII. Title VII states in part: 
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). 
15. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), modified, 452 F.2d 327 
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); see also Western Addition Community 
Org. v. Alioto, 340 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (holding that fire departments carried 
out discriminatory practices); Chicano Police Officers' Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431 (1Oth 
Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 426 U.S. 944 (1976); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 
(1st Cir. 1972) (holding that police departments carried out discriminatory practices); 
Johnson v. Louisiana State Empl. Servo in Shreveport, 301 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. La. 1968) 
(holding that a state agency carried out discriminatory practices). 
16. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
17. See, e.g., Woerner v. Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517, 518-21 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding 
that a series of actions, including belittlement of the plaintiff in front of her co-workers, 
repeated sexual advances, the interception of her mail and phone messages, constituted sex 
discrimination which warrants a remedy under Section 1983). 
18. See Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 1989). 
19. See, e.g., Welch v. Johnson, 907 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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federal court. 20 Furthermore, because Title VII provides for its own 
enforcement, a concurrent Section 1983 claim could be precluded unless it 
is based on substantive rights distinct from Title Vll.21 
C. DISCRIMINATION AND SECTION 1983 
Even though federal district and circuit courts, have handled several 
sexual harassment cases brought under Section 1983,22 the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not heard or granted certiorari to hear a claim of sexual 
harassment by a public employee23 against a public official acting under 
color of state law.24 The purpose of this article is to apply legal reasoning 
and analysis to predict the decision the Court will probably make when it 
considers the issue of whether a public official is acting under color of state 
law when he sexually harasses another employee, therefore giving rise to 
a Section 1983 claim. In addressing this issue, this article assumes that the 
sexual harassment plaintiff is alleging harassment in the context of Section 
1983 on the basis of her sex under Title VII and/or sex discrimination in 
violation of the equal protection clause, and not under several federal 
20. See, e.g., Headley v. Bacon, 828 F.2d 1272, 1275 (8th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff brought 
Title VII and other Civil Rights Act claims against the same defendants in separate actions; 
the later claims were barred by res judicata); see Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); see also Poe v. John Deere Co., 695 F.2d 1103, 1105-08 (8th 
Cir. 1982); Brown v. St. Louis Police Dept., 691 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1982) (prior state court 
action barred Federal Civil Rights Act claims in federal court), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908 
(1983). 
21. See, e.g., Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989). A 
public employee brought a sex discrimination action against her employer and supervisor. 
The court held that Title VII did not prohibit the bringing of a concurrent employment 
discrimination claim under Section 1983. The court reasoned that the Section 1983 claim 
sought compensatory and punitive damages for violations of the plaintiff's due process and 
equal protection rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the 
Constitution. Id. See also Bert v. County of Westchester, 849 F.2d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(allowing concurrent Section 1983 and Title VII claims); Wade v. Orange County Sheriff's 
Office, 844 F.2d 951, 952 (2d Cir. 1988) (allowing concurrent Sections 1981, 1983 and 
Title VII claims based on a common nucleus of facts); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 
1094, 1106 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming judgment for plaintiffs on concurrent Section 1983 and 
Title VII claims). 
22. See, e.g., Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
a police lieutenant who brought a sexual harassment claim under Section 1983 alleging the 
violation of a constitutional right is not required to plead a violation of Title VII); Starrett, 
876 F.2d at 808 (county employee brought sexual harassment claim under Section 1983 
against her supervisor, a public official); Foragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552 
(S.D. Fla. 1994) (former life guards brought sexual harassment claim under Section 1983 
against the City of Boca Raton and two of its employees); Webb v. Hyman, 861 F. Supp. 
1094 (D.D.C. 1994) (correctional officer brought sexual harassment claim under Section 
1983 against the District of Columbia and certain of its officials in the Department of 
Corrections). 
23. For purposes of Section 1983, a person is a public employee if her supervisor has 
authority by virtue of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,49-50 (1988). 
24. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text. 
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statutes and state laws that may also form the basis of sexual harassment 
claims.25 
D. PROLOGUE 
Part II defines and discusses sexual harassment.26 It also examines the 
reasonable woman standard which has recently been adopted by several 
courts in evaluating sexual harassment claims.27 Part III analyzes sexual 
harassment claims brought in the context of Section 1983 in connection 
with a substantive statute, and discusses when one is acting under color of 
state law,28 whether Section 1983 provides adequate relief for sexual 
harassment victims against public officials and municipalities,29 causa-
tion,30 and burden of proof.31 Part IV discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the application of Title VII to sexual harassment claims,32 
how Congress sought to strengthen its application with the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991,33 and whether Title Vll preempts a Section 
1983 claim.34 Part V discusses the equal protection clause in the context 
of a Section 1983 claim brought for sexual harassment. 35 Part VI includes 
a synopsis of Section 1983, Title Vll, and the equal protection clause and 
predicts the Supreme Court's ultimate interpretation of whether a public 
official is acting under color of state law when he sexually harasses another 
employee, therefore giving rise to a Section 1983 claim.36 
25. See, e.g., Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(employee brought action against fonner employer and supervisor alleging sexual 
harassment and state law tort of outrageous conduct); Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile 
Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992) (employee filed action against her 
former employer seeking to hold it liable for sexual harassment inflicted by a co-employee 
under federal statutes and under the state law claim of invasion of privacy); Doe v. 
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (hostile environment sexual 
harassment claims may be brought under Title IX of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
26. See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra notes 110-117 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 118-132 and accompanying text. 
35. See infra notes 133-146 and accompanying text. 
36. See infra notes 147-152 and accompanying text. 
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II. Sexual Harassment: Old Views and Modem Trends 
A. DEFINING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
The National Organization for Women (NOW) offers a comprehensive 
definition of sexual harassment. 37 The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's (EEOC's) definition of sexual harassment recognizes two 
forms of sexual harassment:38 "quid pro quo" sexual harassment,39 or 
"sexual coercion;'~o and abusive or "hostile" environment sexual harass-
ment.41 
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when a superior threatens a 
subordinate to take a negative action or to withhold a positive action unless 
the subordinate acquiesces to sexual demands. Generally courts easily 
recognize and identify quid pro quo harassment, and consistently hold 
companies and corporate officials liable for the acts of their supervisory 
37. NOW's definition of sexual harassment states: 
Any repeated or unwanted verbal or physical sexual advances, sexually 
explicit derogatory statements, or sexually discriminatory remarks made by 
somebody in the workplace which are offensive or objectionable to the 
recipient or causes the recipient discomfort or humiliation or which 
interferes with the recipient's job perfonnance, and any attention of a sexual 
nature in the context of a work situation which has the effect of making a 
woman uncomfortable on the job, impeding her ability to do her work, or 
interfering with her job perfonnance or employment opportunities. 
NOW originally developed the definition to infonn employers and employees of what 
actions and types of behavior constitute sexual harassment. The Working Women's Institute 
later amended the definition in preparation of an amicus curiae brief. See Continental Can 
Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980). The resulting definition is generally regarded 
as the definition of sexual harassment utilized by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. 
38. The EEOC defines sexual harassment as: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature when (1) submission to such conduct is 
made either explicitly or implicitly a tenn or condition of an individual's 
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual 
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or 
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with 
an individual's work perfonnance or creating an intimating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990). 
39. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32 (1979) 
(coining the tenn "quid pro quo"). 
40. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CW.-KENT L. 
REv. 359, 386 (1993) (describing how attitudes about women's autonomy will shape courts' 
interpretation of the new crime of sexual coercion). 
41. See ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND PRACTICE 
15-17. Even though the two categories involve distinct elements of proof, cases often 
contain allegations of both types of harassment. 
± biNii iii Ii' 
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employees who, on the basis of sex, deny an employee a promotion or a 
salary increase, or make an unwanted transfer or discharge.42 
Hostile environment sexual harassment occurs when unwelcome sexual 
conduct has the effect or purpose of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual's work performance or creates an intimidating or offensive work 
environment.43 It is far less easily identified and far more controversial 
than quid pro quo harassment.44 In Meritor Save Bank FSB v. Vinson,45 
the Supreme Court held that a hostile work environment can arise from 
harassment which is sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions 
of employment and create an abusive working environment. However, the 
Supreme Court did not detail the kind of behavior that creates an abusive 
working environment, thus leaving it to the lower courts' interpretation. In 
1993, the Court through the pen of Justice O'Connor reaffirmed the Vinson 
standard and noted that concrete psychological harm is not a necessary 
predicate to maintain a cause of action.46 "The same actions one person 
sees as harassing or intimidating may be seen by another as innocent or 
merely boorish. '~7 
B. PREVALENCE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE REASONABLE 
WOMAN 
Surveys and studies have reported that sexual harassment is more 
prevalent and wide-spread than once believed.48 Courts have taken note 
42. See, e.g., Dey V. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
the timing of the discharge decision, coming only four weeks after the plaintiffs complaints 
and less than two weeks after her $60 per week raise, supported the inference that the 
plaintiff was the victim of discrimination); see also Wheeler V. Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 
1246, 1249 (6th Cir. 1989) (a constructive discharge claim may be viable where an 
employee has been subjected to abuse and harassment on the job); Roberts V. College of the 
Desert, 870 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1988) (as amended Mar. 15, 1989) (affirming verdict 
against defendant in a Section 1983 action grounded on denial of due process and equal 
protection based upon sex discrimination manifested through demotion and other restrictions 
in the workplace). 
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1 (a)(3) (1985). 
44. Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigm for Sexual Harassment: Toward the Optimal Level of 
Loss, 47 VAND. L. REv. 427, 453 (1994). 
45. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
46. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993). 
47. Fran Sepler, Sexual Harassment: From Protective Response to Proactive Prevention, 
11 HAMUNE 1. PuB. L. & POL 'y 61, 65-66 (1990). 
48. One 1988 study by Working Women magazine reported that 90% of Fortune 500 
companies had received complaints from employees in one year. L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1990, 
at Al (Sunday, Home Edition). NOW reported in a recent survey that more than 80% of 
women claimed to have been sexually harassed. Id. A recent survey for the U.S. military 
found that 64% of American military women who responded to the survey said they had 
been harassed in some manner. Id. Surveys in the private workplace have found that 30% 
to 40% of women complain of sexual harassment. Id. See also BARBARA LINDEMANN & 
DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPWYMENT LAW 4 (1992) (quoting L.A. 
Times article). 
tt"-
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of this fact and are modifying their attitudes when assessing sexual 
harassment claims.49 
Traditionally, courts have used the "reasonable person" test to 
determine what constitutes unreasonable harassment. 50 "Recently, 
however, several courts have adopted a reasonable woman standard, 
affirming two popular notions: women and men perceive instances of 
sexual conduct in the workplace differently, and sexual conduct has very 
different implications and consequences for women than it does for 
men.,,51 
F or example, the Ninth Circuit has established and adheres to the 
reasonable woman standard and even uses that standard interchangeably 
with the related reasonable victim standard.52 These two standards are 
related and can be used interchangeably because women comprise the 
majority of victims of sexual harassment. 53 
III. Section 1983 and the Sexually Harassed Public Employee 
A. ACTING UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW OR PRIVATE PURSUITS? 
Section 1983 is a remedial statute which creates no independent 
substantive rights54 but is used to enforce federal rights derived from other 
sources. 55 To determine whether the plaintiff has a valid claim of 
49. Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Responding to Claims o/Sexual Harassment, 
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 18, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter KLEIN]. 
50. Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Intolerability of 
working conditions ... is assessed by the objective standard of whether a reasonable person 
in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign") (emphasis added). 
51. Jolynn Childers, Note: Is There a Place For a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A 
Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 854, 856 (1993); see also Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 894 (stating that "A male supervisor 
might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate that she 
has a "great figure" or "nice legs." The female subordinate, however, may find such 
comments offensive."); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding "Men, 
who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without full 
appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may 
perceive. "). 
52. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the severity and 
pervasiveness of the sexual harassment should be assessed from the perspective of a 
reasonable victim who is generally a reasonable woman). 
53. B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B. U. 
L. REv. 1, 2 (1993) (stating that women are primarily the victims of sexual harassment); see 
also B. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 58 (1985) ("Over 20 percent of women have 
quit a job, been transferred, been fired, or quit applying for a job because of sexual 
harassment"); Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability For Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461 (1986) (finding women to be the main victims of 
sexual harassment). 
54. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (lOth Cir. 1984), affd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Schuster 
v. Thraen, 532 F. Supp. 673 (D. V.I. 1982). 
55. See Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989). 
''I.'t • 
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discrimination under Title VII and/or the equal protection clause in the 
context of Section 1983, courts apply a two-prong test enunciated in West 
v. Atkins. 56 First, the plaintiff must allege the violation of rights secured 
by the Constitution and/or the laws of the United States. Second, the 
plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of state law committed 
the violation. 57 
One acts under color of state law if he or she exercises "power 
possessed by virtue of state law.,,58 Thus, for example, a public employee 
acts under color of state law while acting in his or her official capacity or 
while exercising his or her responsibilities pursuant to state law. 59 
Federal district courts generally hold that acts of public officials in the 
ambit of their personal private pursuits fall outside their official capacity 
or responsibility.60 For example, one district court which addressed the 
issue held that "defendants who harassed another employee during working 
hours were not acting under color of state law because the harassing 
behavior had nothing to do with, and bore no similarity to, the nature of 
their jobS.,,61 As a consequence, Section 1983 cannot be used to deal with 
such behaviors. 
56. 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). 
57. [d. at 48; accord Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overroled in part on 
other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331 (1986); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 
1978). 
58. West, 487 U.S. at 49 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941»; 
accord Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overroled in part on other grounds, 
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978); Polk County v. 
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,317-318 (1981). 
59. West, 487 U.S. at 50. See also Poulsen v. City of N. Tonawanda, 811 F. Supp. 884 
(W.D.N.Y. 1993), where the female plaintiff, a former police officer, filed action against 
the city, police chief and police lieutenant for quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile 
work environment in violation of Title VII and an applicable state law, and for violation of 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Section 1983. [d. at 893. In her summary 
judgment motion, the plaintiff argued that the police lieutenant was acting under color of 
state law when the alleged sexual harassment occurred. [d. at 895. In his summary 
judgment motion, the police lieutenant argued that he was not acting under color of state 
law. [d. at 894. The lieutenant further argued that one engaged in sexual harassment can 
never be acting under color of state law. [d. The court denied the lieutenant's summary 
judgment motion, reasoning that he had state authority over the plaintiff and that the case 
should proceed to determine whether he was liable for sexual harassment under Section 
1983. Id. at 895. Cf Hughes v. Halifax County Sch. Bd., 855 F.2d 183, 186-87 (4th Cir. 
1988) (declining to find Section 1983 liability against a co-employee for harassment when 
the harassment did not involve use of state authority or position), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
1042 (1989). 
60. See, e.g., Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 118 (1976). 
61. Murphy v. Chicago Transit Auth., 638 F. Supp. 464, 468 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see also 
Rembert v. Holland, 735 F. Supp. 733, 736 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that the alleged 
sexual demands, which plaintiff rejected, could only have been made in pursuit of personal 
and not governmental interests). 
M 
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However, federal circuit courts have never decided whether sexual 
harassment falls outside of Section 1983 when it is committed by a public 
official. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court will ultimately have to decide 
whether to expand Wesf>2 to include sexual harassment claims brought 
under Section 1983, or to follow precedent63 which states that public 
officials are not acting under color of state law when they are acting in the 
ambit of their personal private pursuits. 
The Supreme Court should expand on the holding in West and find that 
public officials are acting under color of state law when they violate an 
individual's constitutionally protected rights. By holding otherwise, a 
public official would be able to claim that he acted in the ambit of his 
personal private pursuits anytime a Section 1983 claim is filed against him. 
For example, a prison guard who allegedly violated a prisoner's constitu-
tional rights by using excessive force to subdue the prisoner may claim that 
he acted pursuant to his personal private pursuits because the prisoner 
threatened to hurt his person or the prisoner used profane language against 
the guard's family. In essence, the common affirmative defense to a 
Section 1983 claim will become the fashionable saying: "It was personal." 
B. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LIABILITY AND MUNICIPALITIES 
A sexual harassment plaintiff may also decide to file a lawsuit under 
Section 1983 against the municipality which employs the public official 
who harassed the plaintiff if the municipality neglects to alleviate the 
hostile work environment.64 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that a municipality cannot be vicariously liable for the acts of its officers 
unless the plaintiff's injury occurs as a result of an established policy or 
custom of the municipality.65 For a municipality to be liable under 
Section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of its employees, plaintiffs must 
plead and prove that: (1) an official policy or custom established by a 
policymaker66 (2) caused the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a 
constitutional right.67 A causal link cannot be inferred from municipal 
inaction alone.68 
62. 487 U.S. 42 (1988). 
63. See, e.g., Stengel, 522 F.2d at 441. 
64. Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
65. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978). A course of 
conduct is considered a "custom" when "such practice[s] of government officials [are] so 
permanent and well settled" as to virtually constitute law. [d. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. 
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 151 (1970». Liability is imposed on a municipality only 
when "under color of some official policy, [the government] 'causes' an employee to violate 
another's constitutional rights." [d. at 692. 
66. See St. Louis v. Praprotinik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (stating that the identification 
of policy-making officials is a question of state law). 
67. Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1983). 
68. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
"71 
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These elements are difficult to prove in most cases. For example, the' 
Second Circuit has stated that "official policy cannot ordinarily be inferred 
from a single incident of illegality. ,Xi9 Further, wrongful conduct will 
generally not give rise to the finding of an official policy where the 
wrongful conduct is committed by actors below the policymaking level of 
the municipality.70 As a result, a municipality cannot be held liable for 
sexual harassment by one of its employees under Section 1983 if the 
employee's actions cannot be reasonably attributed to a municipal practice 
or policy.71 In addition, isolated and sporadic acts of sexual harassment 
by a supervisor directed at one or a few female members of the staff does 
not constitute the persistent wide-spread practice necessary to establish 
"custom" for Section 1983 liability.72 
Further, a Section 1983 claim against a municipality must be dismissed 
absent proof of a department-wide conspiracy or practice to sexually 
discriminate. In fact, a sexual harassment plaintiff can prove that a munici-
pality is liable under Section 1983 only by showing that its management 
either "repeatedly failed to make any meaningful investigation into [the] 
charges,,73 against its officers, or "customarily failed to train its employees 
and displayed a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those 
within its borders .... "74 Accordingly, a Section 1983 claim must be 
dismissed absent proof of a department-wide conspiracy or practice to 
sexually discriminate.75 
Finally, if a court finds that the municipality is liable under Section 
1983 due to an established policy or custom to sexually discriminate or 
harass, the plaintiff would be entitled to compensatory and punitive 
69. Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 195 (2d Cir. 1980). 
70. Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1045 (2d Cir. 1989); Fiaco v. City of Rensselaer, 
783 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1986). 
71. Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 576-77 (2d Cir. 1989). 
72. Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (''To establish a 
policy or custom, it is generally necessary to show a persistent and wide-spread practice"); 
but see Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (defining "official 
policy" as "( 1) a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially 
adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers, or by an official to 
whom lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or, (2) a persistent, wide-spread 
practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by an officially 
adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom 
that fairly represents municipal policy."). 
73. Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991). 
74. Powell, 891 F.2d at 1045. 
75. See Rodriguez v. Furtado, 950 F.2d 805, 813 (1st Cir. 1991) (where body cavity 
search and police officer's conduct were both reasonable, "there is no causal connection 
between any deficient city policy manifested by the search" and the alleged constitutional 
violation); Bums v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 239 (1st Cir. 1990) (concluding "there was no 
evidence of any deficient city policy or custom regarding strip searches" to fmd police 
officers violated the complainant's rights). 
-
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damages. Therefore, Section 1983 provides adequate relief for sexual 
harassment victims against municipalities where there is an established 
discriminatory policy. 76 
C. ESTABLISHING A CAUSAL CONNECTION 
Courts require the complainant to show a causal connection between 
the alleged sexual harassment and her sex.77 A causal connection is often 
required to overcome the defendant's contentions that the plaintiff filed a 
complaint only because she has a "grudge" against her employer. 78 
In Henson v. City of Dundee, 79 the Eleventh Circuit used a "but for" 
test to determine whether there was a causal connection. Thus, the 
complainant could prove that the h~assment occurred on the basis of her 
sex simply by showing that, "but for" her sex, the harassment would not 
have occurred. 80 However, the required nexus to the plaintiff's gender 
will not be established merely because the plaintiff's "sex" somehow 
played a role.81 
Furthermore, with respect to municipalities, a causal connection 
between the official policy or custom and the conduct complained of must 
be established before the court finds the municipality liable under Section 
1983.82 "The mere invocation of a 'pattern' or 'plan' will not suffice 
without this causal lin1e ,,83 The plaintiff must link the behavior in 
question to the municipality's policy or failure to discipline. Thus, the 
76. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
77. DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1986). 
78. See Price v. Public Servo Co., 850 F. Supp. 934,946 (D. Colo. 1994) (defendant was 
granted summary judgment since the plaintiff was unable to "show any causal connection 
between her protected activities and her termination" and because she could not 
"demonstrate that the functional analysis [test] was a pretext for discrimination"). 
79. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
80. Id. at 904; cf DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308. In DeCintio, the court held that a hospital 
could not be held liable for sex discrimination even though its program administrator 
disqualified seven male applicants from a therapist position to promote the woman with 
whom he was romantically involved. Id. While the court conceded the decision was unfair 
and pretextual, it restricted the word "sex" to its "traditional definition" and refused to find 
that the men had been discriminated "on the basis of sex" under Title VII. Id. No causal 
link existed because "[the disqualified male applicants] faced exactly the same predicament 
as that faced by any woman applicant for the promotion ... " Id. 
81. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308. 
82. See Leatherman v. Tarrant City Narcotics Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993) (stating that 
a municipality cannot be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the 
constitutional injury); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (holding that a 
municipality may be liable under Section 1983 if there is a direct causal connection between 
a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation); City of Oklahoma 
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) (plurality opinion) (stating that to prevail against 
a municipality in a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must demonstrate a close causal 
connection between the policy and the injuries suffered). 
83. Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983), (quoting Black v. Stephens, 
662 F.2d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982». 
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complainant must show that the civil rights violation occurred when the 
accused public official was acting pursuant to the municipality's policy.84 
If the public official was not acting in conformity with some policy of the 
municipality, then the municipality cannot be held liable.85 
It is unusually difficult to prove causation and thus establish a prima 
facie case of sexual harassment. For example, one district court stated: 
If the plaintiff's view were to prevail, no supervisor could, 
prudently, attempt to open a social dialogue with any subordinate 
of either sex. An invitation to dinner could become an invitation 
to a federal lawsuit. ... And an inebriated approach by a supervi-
sor to a subordinate at the office Christmas party could form the 
basis of a federal lawsuit. 86 
Additionally, where courts have found that causation has been adequately 
shown, they have declined to provide relief by reasoning that, while sexual 
harassment is distasteful, it is nothing more than what one court termed 
"personal proc1ivity.,,87 This line of reasoning by the courts has undoubt-
edly thwarted sexual harassment victims from filing complaints against 
their subordinates, supervisors or municipality. 
D. BURDEN OF PROOF: PROVING A SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM 
The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a three-step inquiry which 
governs plaintiff's burden of proof in Title vn and sex discrimination cases 
generally. 88 The inquiry first set forth in McDonnell Doug/as Corp. v. 
Green89 was summarized in Texas Dep ~ of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine90 as follows: 
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the 
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection. Third, should the defendant 
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have the opportunity to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate 
84. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306. 
85. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992) (stating that "a 
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor"). 
86. Tomkins v. PSE & G Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D. N.J. 1976). 
87. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975); see also Barnes 
v. Train, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974) (stating the basis of the plaintiff's complaint is 
"an inhannonious personal relationship"), rev'd sub nom., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 
(D.C. Cir. 1977). 
88. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
89. ld. 
90. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
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reasons offered by the defendant were not true reasons, but were 
a pretext for the discrimination.91 
As recently emphasized by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing 
Co. v. Atonio,92 the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of persuading the 
trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her.93 
The same inquiry applies to claims under Section 1983.94 Therefore, to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must show that 
"she is a member of a protected class, that she is qualified for the job in 
question, that the employer rejected or discharged her despite her qualifica-
tions and that the employers sought other applicants for the plaintiff's 
position. ,,95 
Moreover, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, such as a 
discharge or demotion, the plaintiff needs to show that she reported the 
sexual harassment, that the employer knew of her report, and that her report 
was followed closely by adverse employment decisions affecting her.96 
Once the sexually harassed victim establishes a prima facie case, she can 
recover both compensatory and punitive damages under Section 1983.97 
Iv. Relief for Sexually Harassed Employees Under Title VII 
A. TITLE vn AND TRADITIONAL TORT REMEDIES 
In 1964, the word "sex" was added to Title VII as a way to enact 
legislation that would prohibit employment discrimination based on sex. 
As with the enactment of Section 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 1871,98 the 
predecessor of Section 1983, there was little congressional debate on this 
proposal to expand the reach of Title vn.99 
Since the enactment of Title vn, which is administered and enforced 
by the EEOC, employee victims of discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin have had the opportunity to sue their 
91. ld. at 252-53 (citations omitted). 
92. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
93. ld. at 644. 
94. Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 888 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1989). 
95. ld. at 7 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). 
96. Davis v. State Univ. of N.Y., 802 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1986). 
97. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (holding that a jury may be permitted 
to assess punitive damages in a Section 1983 action when the defendant's conduct involves 
reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's federally protected rights, as well as when 
it is motivated by evil motive or intent); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,255 (1978) (stating 
that "The purpose of Section 1983 is to compensate persons for injuries caused by the 
deprivation of Constitutional rights"). 
98. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
99. See Susan Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299, 299-300 (citing 110 CONGo REc. 2577-84, 2718-21 (1964)) 
[hereinafter MATHEWS]. 
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employers in federal court. A plaintiff can prevail in a discrimination claim 
under Title VII if she proves that the discrimination was intentiona1.1oo 
In 1986, the Supreme Court held that sexual discrimination which 
creates a hostile or abusive work environment is a form of employment 
discrimination that violates Title VII. 101 To prevail in a sexual harass-
ment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove five elements: 
(1) she belongs to a protected group, 
(2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, 
(3) the harassment was based on sex, 
(4) the harassment affected a 'term, condition, or privilege' of 
employment, and 
(5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in 
question and failed to take proper remedial action. 102 
Before the enactment of Title VII, there was no legal remedy available 
for victims of sex, race, or ethnic employment discrimination. However, 
victims of sexual harassment could maintain a cause of action under 
traditional tort theories such as assault, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, or invasion of privacy. 103 
In contrast to tort remedies, Title VII affords remedies which operate 
to redress the impact of discriminatory practices or actions on protected 
groups rather than on particular individuals. I04 The aim of Title VII is 
to prohibit all practices, in whatever form, that create inequalities in the 
workplace among identifiable social groups. lOS However, as one legal 
scholar noted, "Title VII falls short of the goal of eliminating sexual 
harassment in the workplace."I06 
Where courts have afforded victims of sexual harassment a remedy 
under Title VII, it has usually taken the form of injunctions forbidding 
harassing practices or mandating the establishment of grievance procedures 
as well as back-pay awards, reinstatement, attorneys' fees, and court 
costs. 107 However, legal scholars agree that the goals of Title VII have 
not been well served by limiting prevailing plaintiffs to equitable relief 
100. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89-91 (1986). 
101. Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,63-69 (1986). 
102. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982). 
103. See supra note 25. 
104. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (l971). 
105. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (l976). 
106. MATHEWS, supra note 99, at 303. 
107. See Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., 711 F.2d 1524 (lith Cir. 1983) 
(awarding back-pay and attorneys' fees); see also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (granting injunction, back-pay, and promotion). 
£ 
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only. 108 One judge presiding over a sexual harassment suit noted, "to the 
extent that Title VII fails to capture the personal nature of the injury done 
to this plaintiff as an individual, the remedies provided by that statute fail 
to appreciate the relevant dimensions of the problem in this case."I09 
B. REASSESSING RELIEF AFFORDED BY TITLE VII 
In 1990, Congress finally attempted to address the inadequacy of relief 
provided by Title VII for instances of sexual harassment. llO The Civil 
Rights Act of 1990, ultimately vetoed by President George Bush, III 
proposed amendments to Title VII that would have provided for compensa-
tory and punitive damages in certain sexual harassment cases. 112 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which contains the same amendments as 
those proposed in the Act of 1990, was eventually signed into law by 
President Bush. I 13 However, it does not resolve all of the problems 
facing both women in the workplace and sexual harassment plaintiffs in 
court. I 14 After the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, verdicts 
are "subject to sliding scale limits, ranging from $50,000 for companies 
with 15 to 100 employees to $300,000 for companies with more than 500 
employees. Thus, victims of sexual harassment in states such as California 
and Texas which place no limits on recovery of such damages may be 
better off relying on state law rather than on the new federal law.,,1l5 
Nonetheless, the 1991 Act is a good start since individuals alleging sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment under Title VII are no longer afforded 
only equitable relief. 116 The threat of monetary judgment compels people 
to think twice before they commit sexual harassment. In addition, many 
108. See Ruth C. Vance, Workers' Compensation and Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace: A Remedy For Employees, or a Shield For Employers?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 
141, 150 (1993) (limited remedies under Title VII did not serve to deter employers from 
allowing sexual discrimination in the workplace and did not make sexual discrimination 
victims whole); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title 
VII, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1465 (1984) (recognizing that limiting "abusive environment" 
plaintiffs to equitable relief does not serve Title VII's goals). 
109. Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891, 897 (D.D.C. 1982). 
110. See H.R. 4000, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); see also S. 2104, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1990). 
111. Rights Veto Sends a Wrong Message, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1990, at B6. 
112. David G. Savage, Senate Debate Opens On Bill to Reverse Rights Rulings, L.A 
TIMES, July 11, 1990, at A13; Marcia D. Greenberger, The Costs of Discrimination, L.A 
TIMES, June 26, 1990, at A20. 
113. Andrew Rosenthal, Reaffirming Commitment, Bush Signs Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 1991, at AI. 
114. See MATHEWS, supra note 99, at 299. 
115. Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Comparative Study of Great Britain and the 
United States, 13 COMPo LAB. L. 293, 330 (1992). 
116. David A Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, C779 AL.1. 
639, 641 (1992). 
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companies have enacted or proposed policies to combat sexual harassment 
because of the fear of being held vicariously and monetarily liable for the 
actions of their supervisory employees. 117 
C. DOES TITLE VII PREEMPT A SECTION 1983 CLAIM? 
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decide on the viability of actions 
brought under both Section 1983 and Title vn as the Court has done with 
respect to actions brought concurrently under Section 1985 and Title vn 
claims. I 18 The issue of whether Title VII provides an exclusive avenue 
of relief for sexual harassment victims was first considered by the Western 
District of Wisconsin. I 19 In Huebschen v. Department of Health and 
Social Services a demoted state employee alleged that she was sexually 
harassed by her employer. 120 The district court allowed the state employ-
ee to bring suit under both federal statutes even though the Title vn 
violation was the only basis for the Section 1983 claim. 121 However, on 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit did not consider whether Title VII provides an 
exclusive remedy for employment discrimination, thus preempting a Section 
1983 cause of action. The court decided the issue on procedural rather than 
substantive grounds. 122 The court reasoned that there is no legal basis for 
allowing the plaintiff-appellee to bring a Section 1983 suit against his 
employer based on Title VIT when he could not sue his employer directly 
under Title VIT. 123 This reasoning is correct since Section 1983 is 
available as a remedy for violations of federal statutes as well as for 
constitutional violations. 124 In Huebschen, the court held that the plaintiff 
could not bring an action under Section 1983 based on Title VII because 
the defendant was not an "employer" within the meaning of Section 
703(a)(l) of Title VII, therefore there was no basis for the Section 1983 
claim. 125 
The issue of whether Title VII provides for an exclusive remedy in a 
discrimination case was re-considered by the Seventh Circuit in Ratliff v. 
City of Milwaukee. 126 The plaintiff brought a cause of action under Title 
VII and Sections 1985 and 1983 alleging illegal discharge from employ-
117. See KLEIN, supra note 49, at 3. 
118. See Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (holding 
that a Section 1985 claim cannot be brought concurrently with a Title VII claim). 
119. Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168 (W.O. Wis. 
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983). 
120. ld. 
121. ld. at 1169-70; see also Shauna K. Candia, The Hostile Work Environment: Are 
Federal Remedies Hostile, Too?, 13 U. HAW. L. REv. 537, 549 (1991). 
122. Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1170. 
123. ld. at 1170-71. 
124. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
125. ld. at 1170. 
126. 795 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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ment. 127 The circuit court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss 
the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim based on race discrimination, conspiracy, 
and equal protection. 128 The circuit court held that the Section 1983 
claim duplicated the Title VII claim. 129 
The circuit court probably wanted to curtail subsequent suits entangling 
Title VII claims with Section 1983 claims. In the area of employment 
discrimination, the court desired to cut off Section 1983 claims where Title 
VII explicitly states in the context of employment discrimination that it is 
unlawful "to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," 130 since it 
provides adequate equitable relief. 131 
In summary, courts tend to dismiss Section 1983 claims falling within 
the umbra of rights proscribed by Title VII where Title VII provides a 
remedy. This appears to be a logical conclusion, especially because the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 affords victims of discrimination monetary as well 
as equitable relief. 132 
V. The Right to Equal Protection 
The second element of a Section 1983 claim requires the plaintiff to 
prove that he or she was deprived of "rights, privileges or immunities 
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.,,133 Courts have 
generally held that freedom from a hostile work environment is a clearly 
established constitutional right under the equal protection clause. l34 
The Seventh Circuit was the first to acknowledge a constitutional claim 
for sexual harassment. 135 Although the Supreme Court has not yet 
specifically held that sexual harassment can violate the equal protection 
clause,136 other federal courts have acknowledged that sexual harassment 
127. Id. at 616. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 612; see also Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1990). 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-2(a) (1982). 
131. Ratcliff was decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. At that 
time, a violation of Title VII afforded the discrimination victim only equitable relief. See 
supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
132. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
133. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). 
134. See, e.g., McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (a supervisor who 
twisted a woman employee's arm had sexually harassed her and was found to have violated 
the employee's constitutional right to equal protection because the court reasoned he would 
not have treated a man in that manner); see also Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 
F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1985) (a supervisor at a bakery plant violated the equal protection 
clause for making a woman employee's job rough by yelling at her, ridiculing her and 
giving her impossible tasks to do). 
135. Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1181 (7th Cir. 1986). 
136. Cf Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (sexual harassment can 
violate Title VII). 
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does violate the right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 137 For example, in King v. Board of Regents,138 a divided panel 
of the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court holding that a university 
dean created a hostile environment by his unwelcome sexual advances and 
thus was liable under Section 1983 for violation of the equal protection 
clause. 139 Thus, a victim of sexual harassment can bring an equal 
protection suit under Section 1983 where the deprivation of the federal 
right occurs under color of state law. 140 
In addition, a plaintiff can bring an equal protection suit against a 
municipality that violates her constitutional rights by allowing an offensive 
and hostile work environment to exist and by failing to protect the plaintiff 
from harassment and retaliation. 141 In 1991, the Second Circuit outlined 
three factors the courts should examine 142 when assessing if the 
municipality's alleged conduct violated a constitutional right. The three 
factors are: 
(1) Whether the right in question was defined with 
"reasonable specificity;" (2) whether the decisional law of the 
Supreme Court and the applicable circuit court support the 
existence of the right in question; and (3) whether under preexist-
ing law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that 
his or her acts were unlawfu1. 143 
At the core of any equal protection action against either a public 
official or a municipality is the claim that the plaintiff is being treated 
differently from others similarly situated. In other words, the sexual 
137. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Bohen v. City 
of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986). In Bohen, the court stated, "Sexual 
harassment of female employees by a state employer constitutes sex discrimination for 
purposes of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Creating abusive 
conditions for female employees and not for male employees is discrimination." Id. at 1185. 
138. 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990). 
139. Id. at 542. In complaints alleging unlawful sexual advances in violation of the equal 
protection clause, the Seventh Circuit distinguishes between (I) lawful discrimination on the 
basis of the complainant's personality and (2) unlawful discrimination based on gender. 
Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1990). 
140. See Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 630-31 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(complainant stated a Section 1983 claim for violation of her constitutional right to privacy 
by alleging that she was forced by her employer's investigator to reveal facts about her 
sexual history and background after she reported that she had been sexually harassed by a 
public official (a co-worker»; but see Arnold v. United States, 816 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 
1987) (holding that plaintitrs sexual harassment claims against post office worker 
supervisor, in the context of Section 1983, failed because she did not allege facts rising to 
the level of constitutional violations; plaintiff made only vague assertions of constitutional 
infringements). 
141. See Bowen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986). 
142. Jennosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1991). 
143. Id. at 550. 
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harassment plaintiff is subjected to an oppressive work environment which 
her male counterparts are not forced to endure. l44 However, it is often 
difficult for the courts to ascertain if one sexual encounter could constitute 
a denial of equal protection. This is because the courts usually do not have 
a clear idea about the plaintiff's work atmosphere. If sexual innuendoes, 
remarks, and gestures were common practice, then one sexual encounter 
described in the record may not be enough to constitute a denial of equal 
protection. However, if the plaintiff worked in a "professional" environ-
ment where such conduct was non-existent, then that one sexual encounter 
described in the record may be enough to constitute a denial of equal 
protection. 
In an attempt to define the scope of the equal protection right, the 
Bohen court stated "[a] single, innocent, romantic solicitation which 
inadvertently causes offense to its recipients is not a denial of equal protec-
tion.,,145 Further, one commentator noted: 
Friendships and flirtations among employees are a normal part of 
the work situation. Comments about a woman's appearance will 
be taken differently by different women. Indeed, in certain 
instances men may not be aware that their conduct is offensive and 
draining to women. Thus, there will be situations in which the 
conduct complained of is not on its face offensive. Is the burden 
therefore on the woman to inform the man that his behavior is 
unwelcome at the risk of losing her cause of action if she does-
n't?l46 
VI. Conclusion 
F or a sexual harassment plaintiff, none of the available means of relief 
provides adequate recovery for the harm suffered. The purpose of Title VII 
is to remove discrimination from the workplace,147 yet damages are 
severely limited, even after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
Section 1983 provides compensatory and punitive damages for sexual 
harassment victims against municipalities where there is an established 
policy or custom. Title VII cannot be the basis of a Section 1983 claim 
against a public official who is not the claimant's employer. Moreover, due 
to the unique factual setting of a sexual harassment action, the elements of 
a traditional tort action for harassment are difficult to prove. Finally, while 
144. Susan M. Faccenda, The Emerging Law of Sexual Harassment: Relief Available to 
the Public Employee, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 677, 687 (1987) [hereinafter FACCENDA]. 
145. Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1186. 
146. WOMEN AND THE LAW 3-23 (Carol Lefcourt, ed., 1993). 
147. In Griggs v. Duke Power Company, the Court stated that the purpose of Title VII 
"was to achieve equality of employment opportunities." 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971). 
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an equal protection action has no such drawback as to remedies or proof 
of the required elements, courts do not feel comfortable finding an equal 
protection violation based on one incident absent proof of a pattern of 
sexual harassment. 
Thus, Section 1983 provides the most favorable recovery for public 
employees in a sexual harassment case. The elements are easier to prove 
than the elements of most tort actions. Further, the possibility of 
recovering compensatory and punitive damages makes a Section 1983 
action more desirable than a Title VII claim which continues to afford only 
limited remedies148 despite the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.149 In addition, Section 1983 provides compensatory and punitive 
damages for sexual harassment victims against municipalities where there 
is an established policy or custom. Even though the set of potential 
plaintiffs and defendants in a Section 1983 action is restricted by the 
requirement that a defendant must act under color of state law and deprive 
the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right, ISO these prerequisites do 
not affect a public employee's sexual harassment claim against a public 
official. 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether a public 
official is acting under color of state law when he sexually harasses another 
employee, thereby giving rise to a Section 1983 claim. In addressing this 
issue the Supreme Court should expressly repudiate any argument that a 
public official acted in the ambit of his personal private pursuits when he 
sexually harassed the plaintiff. Given the limited remedies available under 
Title VII, the Court should first commence a sensitive inquiry into the 
nature of the remedies afforded to plaintiffs and how effectively those 
remedies address violations of fundamental constitutional rights. 151 
Second, upon such inquiry the Court should find that Title VII relief is 
limited and that some plaintiffs will be afforded complete relief only if 
Title VII and Section 1983 can be used in tandem: 52 For the foregoing 
reasons, the Court must conclude that a public official is acting under color 
of state law when he sexually harasses another employee, therefore giving 
rise to a Section 1983 claim. 
148. See, e.g., Andrew v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 728 F.2d 989, 992 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984); 
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
149. John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 
3, 1992, at 3 ("Title VII as amended by the [Civil Rights Act of 1991] has strict caps on 
recoverable damages"). 
150. F ACCENDA, supra note 144, at 680. 
151. See Nancy Levit, Preemption of Section 1983 by Title VII: An Unwarranted 
Deprivation of Remedies, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 265,298 (1987). 
152. Id. at 295. 
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